Response by Alvin, Plantinga
euroPeAN JourNAl For PHIloSoPHY oF relIGIoN 5/3 (AuTumN 2013), PP. 55-73
RESPONSE
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First, thanks very much to my commentators and interlocutors, and 
to the editors of the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. I’m 
delighted to be a part of this symposium.
AD moNToN
I’ll start with some comments on bradley monton’s stimulating piece. 
There is much to talk about here, but I’ll concentrate on just three topics: 
‘methodological Neutralism’, ‘Anti-realistic Science’, and ‘Simulation 
Science’.
‘methodological Neutralism’, as monton conceives it, consists of two 
parts: First, when giving arguments for or against research programmes, 
one should not assume the truth of one particular research programme  − 
the arguments should strive to be neutrally evaluable by proponents of 
any research programme. Second, the neutrally evaluable arguments one 
should give should be scientific arguments (p. 49-50).
I’ll comment just on the first part.
Christian scholars or scientists, I believe, should think of themselves 
as addressing at least two different audiences: on the one hand, the 
Christian scholarly or scientific community, and on the other hand the 
scholarly community at large. That is because Christian philosophers 
or scientists (more exactly, perhaps, the Christian philosophical or 
scientific community) should engage in two different projects. one 
project involves starting from, assuming, taking for granted the whole 
Christian story, and then working at the relevant philosophical or 
scientific questions from that perspective. Another way to put this: in 
any scholarly project, there is the relevant ‘evidence base’, as I call it: the 
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set of propositions to be taken for granted and appealed to in conducting 
the inquiry in question. I was thinking that for the project of Christian 
philosophy (‘Augustinian Philosophy’, as we could call it), the evidence 
base would include the main lines of the Christian story. (Here monton 
(p. 45) slightly misunderstands me: he takes me to be suggesting that the 
evidence base for Augustinian philosophy will include the evidence for 
Christian belief; I was taking it to include Christian belief itself.)
my thought is that the intended audience here would be the Christian 
philosophical community, or the Christian academic community, or 
perhaps the Christian community as a whole; this would be fundamentally 
an intramural project. of course others not within the walls might find 
these discussions of interest, and of course they would certainly be 
welcome to follow the discussions, and make their own contributions 
if they wish. but the intended audience is other Christians − maybe 
Christian philosophers, maybe Christian academics generally, maybe 
Christians generally. In that context, I should think it would be perfectly 
appropriate to assume the truth of a particular research program, or at 
least to assume the truth of Christian belief. I  should think the same 
would go for atheists: they too could sensibly address some of their 
arguments and discussion just to other atheists. Again, non-atheists 
would presumably be welcome to listen in on the conversation, and even 
make their own contributions to it (as long as they didn’t behave like 
trolls); but the fundamental audience would be other atheists.
monton speaks of ‘competition between research projects’, and he 
thinks of Christian scholarship as a ‘degenerating research project’, which 
suggests that it is losing out in this competition. I’m not entirely sure how 
to understand this. Is the idea that we (we human beings) who engage 
in different research projects are also engaged in the common project 
of seeing which program will win? (What would constitute winning or 
losing?) I  think another appropriate project here, for followers of any 
of the 5 projects he mentions, would proceed in a  slightly different 
direction. Suppose I am convinced that Christianity is true (or, for that 
matter, that naturalism is true). I may then want to learn more about 
my world. In so doing, I will presumably want to use all that I know or 
think I know. So if, as I see it, I know that Christianity (or naturalism), is 
true I will include Christian belief (or naturalism) in the evidential base 
for the inquiries I carry out. Now under monton’s suggestion, I might 
do the same thing. I will have an evidential base for my inquiries, and if 
I am pursuing a Christian, (or naturalistic) project, my evidential base 
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for that project will include Christian belief (or naturalism). but I get 
the impression monton thinks my aim (one of my aims?) in so doing is 
to take part in a sort of mega-project − trying to see which projects are 
degenerating and which project is the winner.
Perhaps this would be in the same spirit as the following. monton 
mentions Thomas Nagel’s suggestion for a  research project as an 
alternative to Augustinian science and naturalistic science: monton calls 
it ‘teleological science’. Now Nagel is a bit hesitant and tentative about 
this alternative − or if he isn’t, someone else might be. Such a  person 
might be interested in working at this project, in part, as a  means of 
coming to a judgment about the viability of its underlying metaphysical 
underpinnings. A naturalist or an Augustinian Christian might do the 
same sort of thing: work at naturalistic science or Augustinian science 
in the interests of coming to decide whether or not to adopt, or stick 
with, or reject the underling metaphysical underpinning − in the case 
of Augustinian science, Christian belief, and in the case of naturalistic 
science, naturalism. This seems to me to be very much in the spirit of 
monton’s suggestion.
once again, however, there is quite another spirit in which to 
engage in such a program: you might be convinced that the underlying 
underpinning is correct. You might not be trying to discover whether it 
is, or to discover evidence for or against it; you might instead start from 
the assumption that it is correct, and try to learn more about the world, 
assuming that this perspective is correct. I think this is in fact how many 
naturalists do approach naturalistic scholarship. They are completely 
convinced of the truth of naturalism, and engage in scholarship, not 
to confirm or reject naturalism, but just to learn more about what the 
world is like, taking for granted that naturalism is the truth of the matter. 
(of course this doesn’t imply that a Christian or naturalist who adopts 
this posture would refuse to consider potential or actual defeaters of the 
metaphysical underpinning in question.)
The point would be this: in arguing against other projects, you 
could be addressing others who share your basic commitments; and 
in so doing you could perfectly sensibly presuppose the truth of your 
basic commitments. So my main point here, again, is that a Christian 
or naturalist scholar is a member of several different communities, and 
properly takes for granted different commitments in addressing these 
different communities.
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In conclusion, a  comment or two on a  couple of the other large 
research programs monton identifies. First, antirealist science. I  said 
one sort of stance someone who pursues one of these programs might 
take, is that of assuming that the metaphysical foundation in question is 
correct or true, and then trying to learn more about the world, taking for 
granted the truth of that metaphysical foundation. but how would this 
work for antirealism? monton doesn’t identify the variety of anti-realism 
he has in mind; I take him to be thinking about anti-realism with respect 
to truth, the idea that there really isn’t any such thing as truth understood 
the common sense way, as independent of what we think and how we act 
(at least for truths that aren’t about what we think and how we act). Such 
anti-realisms tend to follow richard rorty in taking truth to be a social 
construction of some kind, in rorty’s words, ‘what your peers will let 
you get away with saying’. How could we think of science or scholarship 
from this perspective? Would it be a matter of trying to find out what 
truths we have constructed in various areas? And would the truths about 
what truths we’ve constructed in various areas themselves be socially 
constructed, constructed by us? If so, is that a problem?
Second, simulation science. Apparently some people seriously 
believe we are (or at least might be) existing in, or living in, or elements 
in, a  computer simulation (the ‘simulation hypothesis’), where this 
simulation is perhaps being run by scientists from some advanced 
civilization. Perhaps these scientists are running computer simulations 
of entire universes, and you and I are people in such a universe. but what 
does this mean, and what would it be like to conduct science from this 
perspective?
First, what exactly is a computer simulation? What is its ontological 
status? Well, perhaps it’s an event of a certain kind, an event consisting 
in the running of a program on a computer. And what sort of thing is 
a computer program? Something like a set of instructions to a computer, 
perhaps in a  computer language like Fortran.  We can think of that 
language, like other languages, in various ways − as sequences of 
abstract types, or as physical exemplifications of such types; but in any 
event the program is such that running it on a computer results in the 
computer’s behaving in a certain way, doing the various things specified 
by that program. The running of such a  program would presumably 
be a  complex event − an event consisting in the occurrence of many 
component events or subevents. And if I am an element in a computer 
simulation, if I am an element in such an event, I am presumably then 
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myself an event. What kind of event? Presumably some kind of pattern 
of electrical activity − not an abstract pattern, but the exemplification of 
such a pattern in the activity of a concrete computer. It looks as if (on 
the simulation hypothesis) I would have to be an event consisting of the 
instantiation of certain patterns of electrical activity.
but is that the sort of thing I could be? I can think about the moon 
and make decisions; I  can love and hate. Could a pattern of electrical 
activity do these things? It’s hard to see how.  Further, events seem to 
have essentially properties of the sort I  seem to have accidentally. An 
event with which I  am identical would have to consist in very many 
subevents − roughly 80 years worth. Now I could have died and gone out 
of existence at the age of 5 (I do accept the Christian hope of immortality, 
but that this hope is fulfilled is contingent). If I were an event, therefore, 
it would have to be possible for that event to exist even if very many 
of its subevents − presumably most of its subevents − had not existed. 
That seems to me to be false: events that consist in other events have 
essentially the property of consisting in those other events.
but perhaps the crucial factor here is the following.1 Consider 
a  simple simulation of a  traffic accident: I  say, ‘Here’s the black buick’ 
(holding up the salt shaker) and ‘Here’s the red Nissan’ (holding up the 
pepper shaker); and ‘Here’s how they collided’ (moving the salt shaker 
from left to right and the pepper shaker perpendicular to the path of the 
salt shaker). In the same way, a more elaborate representation of a Civil 
War battle might employ toy soldiers and toy cannons to represent the 
two armies and their armaments, maybe a light bulb to represent the sun 
(if the sun’s light and direction was a factor in the battle), and perhaps 
still other objects. The key point here is that we use these things of one 
kind to represent things of another, in order to learn or demonstrate 
something about those things of the second kind.
And isn’t this how it is with a  computer simulation? We get the 
computer to do various things; we then take some of those events to 
represent a tornado and what the tornado does. but of course nothing 
the computer does actually is or generates a tornado.
Similarly, if these advanced alien scientists are running a computer 
simulation of a universe, they will take various activities of the computer 
to represent elements in a  universe − you and I, perhaps. Naturally 
enough, however, these activities will not actually be or constitute you or 
1 my thanks to Harry Plantinga and Del ratzsch for help here.
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I or anybody else. So I don’t see how you or I could be part of a computer 
simulation, although of course there could be computer simulations 
elements of which represent us, and represent us as doing this or that.
one final point. Suppose I  do wind up thinking I  am an element 
in a computer simulation. Now in such a simulation, the programmer 
gets to decide what happens. So if I am an element in a simulation, the 
programmer could be deciding what I  think and whether I  form true 
beliefs. Now suppose all I believe on this topic is that I and the rest of 
us are elements in such a simulation: I have no beliefs on the question 
of whether our programmer has made it the case that our beliefs are 
for the most part true, or whether our cognitive faculties are reliable. 
If I  ask myself about the probability that our faculties are reliable, I’ll 
presumably think it’s pretty much an even bet. but how, then, should 
I think about the scientific enterprise? Suppose I think the aim of science 
is to learn about and discover truths about the world. Given that my 
beliefs are as likely to be false as true, I  should presumably think this 
effort to discover truth is fundamentally futile. And even if I follow van 
Fraassen and think of science as an effort to come up with empirically 
adequate hypotheses (whether or not they are true), I’ll have the same 
problem: my beliefs about whether a  given hypothesis is empirically 
adequate are as likely to be false as to be true. So won’t I properly think 
the whole scientific enterprise is an absurd undertaking, a fool’s errand, 
a snipe hunt? of course the same considerations apply to my reflections 
about the feasibility of the scientific enterprise, and to my reflections 
on those reflections, and so on. I have a sort of defeater for the whole 
intellectual or cognitive enterprise, and a defeater for that defeater, and 
a defeater for that defeater ...
The moral: if I  think I  am an element in a  computer simulation, 
then (given that I do raise the question of the reliability of my cognitive 
faculties) I’ll be able sensibly to engage in science only if I  also think 
that the programmer (the Programmer?) has given me for the most part 
reliable faculties.
AD VAN WouDeNberG
I turn next to rene van Woudenberg’s careful and fruitful investigation 
of some of the meanings of the word ‘chance’, and how chance and design 
are related. As far as I  can see, what van Woudenberg says is correct. 
That leaves me, as a  commentator or respondent, in something of 
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a quandary; a responder is supposed to take issue with at least something 
the respondee has said. Since I  am a  follower of William of ockham 
(discidia non sunt multiplicanda praetor necessitatem), I will not invent 
a  disagreement, but instead talk about a  couple of other issues with 
respect to chance and design.
In ‘The Place of Chance in a  World Sustained by God’,2 Peter van 
Inwagen suggests that a chance event is one that is not part of anyone’s 
plan; it’s an event that hasn’t been planned or intended by anyone. Now 
van Inwagen’s ideas as to what God’s plan includes are rather restrictive. 
As he puts it, God’s (eternal) plan is the sum total of what God has 
unconditionally decreed. And he suggests that very often God intends 
a  certain result to occur, unconditionally decrees that it occur, but 
doesn’t care in which particular way it occurs. Thus perhaps God intends 
that I have hair, or even a lot of hair, but doesn’t care about the precise 
number of hairs I have. Perhaps the fact is I have 132,241 hairs on my 
head at present. If it isn’t part of God’s plan that I have that many hairs 
on my head at present, then that I do have that number of hairs now is 
a matter of chance (assuming that it wasn’t part of anyone else’s plan that 
I have 132,241 hairs). Van Inwagen also suggests that it may be a matter 
of chance that there be human beings. No doubt it was (is) part of God’s 
plan that there be rational free creatures capable of loving each other 
and loving him: but perhaps God didn’t care precisely what form such 
creatures would take. Perhaps dolphin-like creatures (or maybe even 
crocodilians?) would do just as well as hominids. Similarly, someone’s 
dying in a  car accident could be a  matter of chance: perhaps it is not 
part of God’s plan that Alice die in this way; assuming that it is not part 
of anyone else’s plan either, that death would be a matter of chance. (of 
course in another sense of ‘chance’ it might not have been a matter of 
chance: there might have been an explanation in terms of failed brakes, 
excessive speed, inattention and the like.)
Now if God intends that I have a lot of hair, then that I have a lot of 
hair is not a matter of chance; God unconditionally decrees that I have 
a lot of hair. What sort of form would such a decree take? Van Inwagen 
suggests that God might issue disjunctive decrees. He might say: Let it 
be that A or B, and I really don’t care which. Perhaps God can also issue 
indeterminate or vague decrees: Let it be that Alice have a lot of hairs, but 
2 In God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell 
university Press, 1995), pp. 42-66.
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I don’t care just how many (or how long). (This would be a vague decree, 
in contrast with a disjunctive decree like Let Alice have n or n+1, or n+2, 
or ... n+n hairs.)
These possibilities raise the question of what we might call deep 
chance. Suppose at creation God decrees: Let there be about 1080 
elementary particles, but I  don’t care exactly how many. Now suppose 
exactly 1080 plus 17 show up. Then that there are just that many particles 
is a matter of deep chance. There is no explanation of it at all; it can’t be 
explained in terms of earlier occurrences in the world, obviously, and 
also not in terms of God’s will or decree; it simply happens, with no cause 
(i.e., there being that many as opposed to three fewer has no cause). 
Deep chance, so specified, stands in contrast to the sorts of chance van 
Woudenberg mentions. And of course an event’s happening by deep 
chance is incompatible with its happening by design.
but is deep chance really possible? That’s a good question. leibniz, 
certainly no slouch, would have thought not − deep chance would violate 
the ‘Principle of Sufficient reason’. If there were such a  thing as deep 
chance, furthermore, would it be necessary that there is? Presumably 
not: presumably God was not obliged to create anything at all; and if he 
had not created anything, there would have been no deep chance events. 
Would deep chance be inevitable if God did create? Again, presumably 
not: God could have issued maximally specific decrees, in which case 
there would again be no room for deep chance. Would deep chance be 
inevitable if God created free creatures − free human beings, for example?
As far as I can see, this too would not guarantee deep chance, at least 
if we make a small clarification or addition to van Inwagen’s definition 
of chance. For suppose I  freely buy a  horse. Then God doesn’t decree 
that I buy a horse, so that my having a horse is not part of God’s plan. 
on the other hand, it’s no part of my plan that, e.g., this horse’s maternal 
grandfather preferred clover hay to alfalfa. So consider the conjunctive 
state of affairs consisting in my owning a  horse whose maternal 
grandfather preferred clover to alfalfa hay. That state of affairs is not 
as such part of God’s plan, and also not as such part of my plan − or 
presumably anyone else’s plan. Nevertheless, of course, it might have 
been part of God’s plan that this particular horse − call it ‘Sam’ − have 
a maternal grandfather of that sort. Hence, if we think of this state of 
affairs as a conjunctive state of affairs, one conjunct is part of my plan 
and the other part of God’s plan. The definition of ‘chance’ should be 
such as to exclude such event or states of affairs as chance events.
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Now return to the question of divine disjunctive decrees, and suppose 
God, as Christians think, is omniscient. Add that omniscience includes 
knowing what would happen if God issued a disjunctive decree: if God 
issued the decree
Let it be that A or B, and I don’t care which,
God would know which of A or b would occur or be actual. (This sort 
of knowledge − knowledge of chance counterfactuals − would go middle 
knowledge one better). Suppose what God knows is that if he issues that 
decree, it is A  that would occur. under those conditions, would there 
really be any relevant difference between God’s issuing the decree
Let it be that A or B, and I don’t care which
and his issuing the decree
Let it be that A?
I’m not sure what to say here. If God knows that if he issues the disjunctive 
decree, it is A that will be actual, then if he does issue that decree, would 
it not be the case that he intends A? And if he intends A, will it not be the 
case that A does not occur by chance?
I’m not sure what to say; therefore I  will leave this question as 
homework.
AD HAlVorSoN
As far as I can see, Hans Halvorson and I have little to argue about. He 
comments on four issues; I’ll say just a bit about each of those comments.
First, he says, ‘Plantinga indicates that if God acts in history, then 
the laws of physics are not deterministic. but from the point of view of 
reformed epistemology, the character of the law of physics should be 
irrelevant to one’s warrant for believing that God has acted.’ ‘God has 
acted’; here I was thinking of ‘special’ divine action: i.e., action that goes 
beyond creation and conservation; so think of God’s acting in history 
as special divine action. miracles would be an example. Now Halvorson 
says that according to me, if God acts in history (if God acts in a way 
that goes beyond conservation and creation) then the laws of physics are 
not deterministic. I didn’t intend to say that, and I’m inclined to doubt 
that it’s true. First, what is it for the laws to be deterministic? Presumably 
the issue, here, is the issue between classical mechanics and quantum 
theory: a law is deterministic just if, given the appropriate input, the law’s 
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output is a particular outcome – rather than, as in quantum mechanics, 
a distribution of probabilities over possible outcomes. but as far as I can 
see, it’s entirely possible both that God acts specially in the world and 
that the laws have this deterministic character. The reason is that, as I see 
it, the natural laws should be thought of as with a proviso, so that the 
form of a law is
When God is not acting specially in the world, p
where p would be the usual formulation of the law; for example,
When God is not acting specially in the world, total energy is 
conserved.
but then of course special divine action is perfectly compatible with 
the laws being deterministic; for any time at which God acts specially is 
a time at which the antecedent of the laws is not fulfilled. So understood, 
the laws say nothing about what happens when God is acting specially in 
the world; hence they can hardly be taken to imply that God does not act 
specially in the world. Another way to put it: the laws, so conceived, do 
not themselves entail that their antecedents are satisfied.
We might ask instead whether special divine action is compatible 
with determinism (as opposed to the proposition that the laws are 
deterministic in the above sense). How shall we think of determinism? 
It’s quite common, nowadays, to define determinism as the following 
proposition: given the natural laws and a  true statement completely 
describing what happens at a  particular time t, what happens at any 
other time t* deductively follows:
(D) For any times t and t*, a  complete description of the state of 
the universe at t conjoined with the natural laws entails a complete 
description of the state of the universe at t*.
let’s take (D) as our account of determinism. Now I think we can see 
that determinism, thus specified, is compatible with special divine 
action. For suppose some form of occasionalism is true, so that God 
causes whatever happens in the (physical?) world. Then God’s actions 
would certainly go beyond creation and conservation; but determinism 
(as specified by (D)) might still be true. For suppose the laws are true 
universal generalizations describing God’s action in the world; it could 
be that these generalizations are rich enough so that their conjunction 
with a  complete description of the universe at a  time t is sufficient to 
entail a  description of whatever happens at any other time. but then 
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determinism in the sense of (D) would be true, and it would also be true 
that God acts specially in the world. So determinism and divine special 
action are compatible.
Why is it tempting to think that determinism and special divine action 
are not compatible? I  think this temptation arises from the following 
picture. Think of the world as something like a vast machine created by 
God, and created in such a way that it evolves according to laws that God 
sets for this vast machine. These laws therefore determine what happens in 
the universe. God upholds the universe in existence; but he doesn’t, or at 
least ordinarily doesn’t, directly cause what occurs in the world. Now take 
these laws to be deterministic, i.e., non-probabilistic: their predictions are 
specific states of affairs, not the distribution of probabilities over possible 
outcomes. Suppose further that (D) holds: the state of the universe at any 
time conjoined with the laws, entails the state of the universe at any other 
time. Then there would be no room for special divine action. For suppose 
God acted specially at a given time t. by (D), the complete description 
of the universe at t − call it ‘ut’ − is entailed by the laws together with 
the state of the universe at some previous time t*. but then if God acted 
specially at t, he would have to act in such a way as to make ut false. So 
determinism is incompatible with special divine action.
As we saw above, this picture is seriously misleading. That is because 
(as I  said above) determinism in the sense of (D) is consistent with 
occasionalism, according to which God is always acting specially in the 
world. Perhaps occasionalism is true and God is the only causal agent 
in the physical universe. The laws, then, would be a description of what 
God does in the universe; how he treats it and how he acts in it. Those 
laws might be rich enough so that their conjunction with a  complete 
description of the u at any time, entails a complete description of the 
universe at any other time. So determinism in this sense is certainly 
compatible with God’s acting specially in the world − acting in ways that 
go beyond creation and conservation.
Given certain conceptions of natural law, furthermore, determinism 
is consistent with God’s sometimes acting specially in the world, and 
sometimes not. It would be consistent with God’s being the cause of 
some of what happens in the universe, and secondary causes (human 
beings, e.g.) being the cause of other things that happen. Footnote 24 
of chapter 3 of WTCrl outlines the Humean/lewisian conception of 
laws of nature, according to which the laws are exceptionless universal 
generalizations supervening on what in fact does happen in the universe. 
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Given such a conception of the laws, determinism would pretty clearly 
be compatible with God’s only sometimes acting specially in the world.
Determinism so taken would also be compatible with human freedom, 
understood as the thought that at a given time t it is sometimes within 
the power of a person to perform a given action A and also within that 
person’s power to refrain from performing A. For even if an exceptionless 
generalization entails that I don’t (for example) raise my hand at a time t, 
it might still have been within my power to do so. (of course if I had 
done so, that generalization would not have been exceptionless, and 
hence would not have been a law.) Given this conception of the laws of 
nature, therefore, compatibilism, the thought that human freedom and 
determinism are compatible, would obviously be the truth of the matter.
Now for a  couple of desultory remarks on Halvorson’s remaining 
three comments.
First. Halvorson says
... while I agree with Plantinga’s hedging of the Newtonian laws, I don’t 
like the idea that these laws are hedged because the universe is an ‘open 
system’ in the sense that local physical systems can be ‘open’. Typically, 
by ‘open system’ we mean a subsystem of a  larger physical system. but 
since God is not physical, the universe is not a subsystem of some larger 
physical system (p. 25).
Certainly physicists, when speaking of open systems, typically think of 
such a system as a subsystem of a larger physical system. but consider 
Halvorson’s statement of the (Newtonian) law of conservation of energy:
‘Ce: When a system is causally closed, then its total energy is conserved.’ 
Isn’t it entirely consistent with Newtonian physics that there be causal 
influence from outside the physical universe? The claim that there is 
no such causal influence would presumably not be part of Newtonian 
physics as such (and of course Newton himself would not have endorsed 
such a statement); it would be more like a philosophical or theological 
add-on. Presumably Newtonian physics just doesn’t address this topic. 
Why think Ce really includes or entails, somehow, the proposition that 
the physical universe is causally closed? but if not, wouldn’t it follow that 
special divine action in the world is not precluded by Ce?
Second. I suggested that perhaps the GrW interpretation or version 
of quantum mechanics is the truth of the matter, and that God typically 
acts in the world by way of divine collapse causation. Halvorson has his 
doubts about this suggestion:
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but what would be the point of saying such a  thing? Ideally relating 
theology to science would help theology to say truth things and to avoid 
saying false things. but the DCC story does not make any interesting 
predictions about what divine interventions did or did not occur. Thus 
while DCC provides an interesting ‘just so’ story attaching it to theology 
wouldn’t make our theology anymore scientific (pp. 27-28).
Agreed. but I  wasn’t making this suggestion in order to make our 
theology more scientific. I was instead thinking about this question of 
intervention, and the way the members of the Divine Action Project 
were trying to come up with a  version of divine action that was not 
interventionistic. I  pointed out that it is exceedingly hard to see what 
intervention would be, given quantum mechanics. even so, I suggested, 
perhaps there is a  way of thinking about divine action in the world 
that would avoid what they take to be the difficulties or problems with 
intervention. The chief difficulty, I thought they thought, was that God 
would sometimes be treating his world in one way and other times 
treating it in a  different way, if he sometimes intervened; this would 
reveal a  sort of inconsistency. As ernan mcmullin put it, for God to 
intervene is for him to ‘deal in two different manners’ with the cosmos he 
has created. I suggested that Divine Collapse Causation would be a way 
in which God could act in the world without this alleged inconsistency: 
he is always acting in the world, and in that respect is not dealing in two 
different manners with his world.
Third. Halvorson proposes that the usual worries about divine action 
and the deliverances of current science is due to an inadequate philosophy 
of science, and in particular to reliance on the notion of a ‘law of nature’. 
Here he quotes reijer Hooykaas:
Calvin, too, ... makes no essential distinction between ordinary events, 
belonging to the order of nature (the rising and setting of the sun) 
extraordinary events (great drought) and miraculous events. The term 
‘supernatural’ is not used. ... He recognizes that God has instituted an 
order of nature and invested things with powers, but he reject the idea 
that only ‘special’ events require divine intervention. God’s providence 
works in the most insignificant things: the sparrow in the roof, the lily of 
the field are under his personal care. (pp. 28-29)
This seems to me quite right. And indeed, it is one of the virtues of the 
DCC story that it precludes precisely the notion that only special events 
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require divine intervention or special divine action: nearly all events 
involve special divine action.
AD berGmANN
michael bergmann’s admirable and densely reasoned piece asks whether 
I am a friend of evolutionary science. As he points out, this question is 
not entirely clear, and I’d like to add another question about the question. 
Suppose you are a friend of evolutionary science: does it follow that you 
believe current evolutionary theory − i.e., the current scientific theory 
of evolution? Well, suppose you are a friend of current physics: does it 
follow that you believe current quantum mechanics? I’d say not. I should 
think someone like bas van Fraassen is indeed a  friend of quantum 
mechanics, but I doubt that he believes it. What he believes instead (as 
I suppose) is that current quantum mechanics is empirically adequate or 
nearly so: that its predictions are for the most part borne out when tested 
by experiment.
of course van Fraassen’s brand of anti-realism could be mistaken; 
perhaps the job of science is to come up with theories that are true, not 
just empirically adequate. even so, however, you might still be doubtful 
about the truth of a theory, but nonetheless count as a friend of science in 
the relevant area. For example, it seems that current quantum mechanics 
and current general relativity are hard to harmonize; you might therefore 
be doubtful about the truth of either or both of them, but still be an 
enthusiastic partisan of contemporary physics. So this question as to what 
counts as being friendly to science, or to a particular scientific theory, 
is multi-faceted and difficult. I shall therefore pursue it no further, but 
instead try to answer the three questions bergmann asks.
First question:
‘Am I right’, says bergmann, ‘in saying that, in WTCrl, your answer to 
key question 1 is “maybe” and that you take both option 3a and option 
(3b) in response to question (3)?’
Here (to spare you some labour) is key question 1:
(1) Do you think God is involved in some special, out-of-the-ordinary, 
non-routine way in the unfolding of evolutionary history?
And here are options (3a) and (3b):
(3a) Given the evolutionary evidence, it may, for all we know, be 
prohibitively improbable that there is an evolutionary pathway (that 
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would fit within the allotted time frame and involve only unguided 
mechanisms such as natural selection, spandrelism, and genetic drift) 
from simple unicellular life to some actual complex organisms we 
know of, in which case these organisms may be better explained by 
appeal to at least some special activity of God than by completely 
unguided naturalistic mechanisms.
and
(3b) religious evidence of some kind (e.g., sacred texts or religious 
experience) strongly suggests that God intentionally brought about 
humans in particular and that may, for all we know, have happened 
via God’s being specially involved in the unfolding of evolutionary 
history.
by way of answer, first, along with most Christians I believe that God 
has created us human beings in his own image. This means at the least 
that God intended that there be creatures of a  certain kind, and took 
action that he knew would result in the existence of creatures of that 
kind. Therefore it is not by unguided natural mechanisms that human 
beings have come to be. The process by which we have come to be is 
a guided process, where I’d count as guided a process God initially set in 
motion, and that required no further tinkering or special action on his 
part for it to issue in the outcome he originally intended. Now suppose 
God had created human beings in that fashion: he chose a set of initial 
conditions that he knew would lead to the existence of human beings, 
and set the process in motion, engaging in no further special action. 
Would that mean, according to bergmann, that God has been involved 
in some special, our-of-the-ordinary, non-routine way in the unfolding 
of evolutionary history, as in question 1? No; bergmann is talking here 
about the unfolding of evolution; not about the process by which the 
original conditions were set.
Given that qualification, however, I  would indeed answer ‘maybe’ 
to question 1. I  would also endorse option 3b. As I  say, it is part of 
Christian belief that God has created human beings in his image. He 
could have done so in several ways. (a) He could have created by way 
of divine collapse-causation; in this case he would be constantly and 
intimately involved in what happens in evolutionary history. However 
this, says bergmann (p. 9), would not be a case of God’s being involved in 
some special, out-of-the-ordinary, non-routine way in the unfolding of 
evolutionary history. (b) Perhaps he could have done so by establishing 
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the right initial conditions and the right laws, and let things go forward 
from there, without any further tinkering; this too would not be a case of 
God’s being involved in some special, out-of-the-ordinary, non-routine 
way. (c) God could have created appropriate initial conditions and laws, 
set in motion a  process, and then occasionally or often intervened, 
redirecting and guiding the process. This would be a  case where God 
is involved in some special, out-of-the-ordinary, non-routine way in 
the unfolding of evolutionary history. because it seems to me a  real 
possibility, I’d answer question 1 with ‘maybe.’
but what about option 3a? This wouldn’t be part of my reason for 
answering ‘maybe’. That is because I’m committed ab initio to the idea 
that if the living world has come to be by way of evolution, then it is 
by way of guided evolution. As far as I  am concerned, our coming to 
be by way of unguided evolution is not one of the options. Still, we can 
speculate about the probabilities of the living world’s having come to 
be by way of unguided evolution, by way of the processes bergmann 
mentions. of course one monkey wrench in the machinery here is that 
along with many other believers in God, I  take God to be a necessary 
being. Now could God have brought it about that the living world came 
to be by way of unguided evolution? Again, this is a sizeable question 
that I  can’t enter into properly here. I’d say that this is perhaps barely 
conceivable, but it certainly isn’t clearly possible.
Still, setting aside God’s being a necessary being (pretending for the 
moment that atheism is possible) and setting aside also the difficulties in 
seeing how life could have come to be in the first place, how probable is it, 
given atheism, that the living world should have come to be (in the time 
available) by way of the naturalistic unguided processes that bergmann 
mentions? I’d say it is extremely, enormously, overwhelmingly improbable. 
Thomas Nagel came to a similar conclusion in Mind and Cosmos; he went 
on to declare that this view is almost certainly false. For this he paid the 
expected price: fellow atheists (feeling betrayed?) suggested that Nagel 
is arrogant, dangerous to children, a  disgrace, hypocritical, ignorant, 
mind-polluting, reprehensible, stupid, unscientific, and in general not 
a nice man. In a more restrained vein, however, several reviews chided 
him for failing to note that many scientific theories − general relativity 
and quantum mechanics come to mind − are monumentally improbable, 
at least from a common-sense perspective, but none the worse for that. 
This is indeed true. The crucial difference, however, is that there is solid 
evidence for these other theories. but where is the evidence for atheistic 
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evolution? Perhaps there is excellent evidence for universal common 
ancestry and for descent with modification.3 Perhaps there is also 
reasonably good evidence for the thought that the main process driving 
descent with modification is natural selection working on genetic 
variation. but where is the evidence for the claim that this process is 
unguided?
As I say, Nagel goes on to declare that atheistic evolution is almost 
certainly false. What he means, I  think, is that atheistic evolution is 
so enormously improbable that it isn’t a  real competitor; it isn’t a  real 
possibility; we have to look for some other theory. Here things get stickier. 
How improbable does a theory have to be, to be inadmissibly improbable, 
such that it isn’t even in the running? And is atheistic evolution as 
improbable as that? I’m not sure I see any way of telling. What is clear, 
however, is that atheistic evolution is enormously less probable than the 
thought that the living world has been brought about by God.
Next, question (II): ‘Do you think that your view on whether the 
evolutionary evidence supports eP makes you at least somewhat 
unfriendly toward evolutionary science?’ eP, says bergmann, is the claim 
that ‘a not-too-long evolutionary pathway from unicellular life to the 
mammalian eye (in a system without any special divine tinkering) is not 
prohibitively improbable’.
Now my view is that the evolutionary evidence does not support 
eP. but does this make me unfriendly towards evolutionary science? 
In what way would that view plausibly be thought to be unfriendly to 
evolutionary science? Well, I suppose it would be unfriendly if it were 
part of current evolutionary science to assert that eP is true, or that the 
evidence supports eP. but is that part of current evolutionary science? 
I’d say not. Perhaps it is part of evolutionary science to assert that there is 
good evidence for the thought that the mammalian eye has come to be by 
way of evolution, and that there is a not-too-long evolutionary pathway 
from unicellular life to the mammalian eye that is not prohibitively 
improbable. but evolutionary science doesn’t take a position on whether 
the whole process is guided or unguided. It doesn’t take a position on 
whether God has guided this whole process by creating initial conditions 
and laws that would ensure the outcome he intends; and it also doesn’t 
take a position on whether God from time to time takes special action in 
3 Although Steven meyer’s new book Darwin’s Doubt (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 
2013) proposes some good reasons for doubting universal common ancestry.
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the process of evolution (i.e., engages in ‘tinkering’). Therefore, it is no 
part of current evolutionary science to assert that there is a not-too-long 
evolutionary pathway − one that involves no divine tinkering − from 
unicellular life to the mammalian eye. And if that is so, then as far as 
I can see, evolutionary science doesn’t take a position on whether the 
evidence supports the thought that there is such an evolutionary pathway.
Now perhaps most evolutionary scientists think the process of 
evolution is in fact unguided, and that eP is in fact true. Disagreeing 
with them on that point, however, doesn’t mean that I am unfriendly to 
evolutionary science. Suppose most physicists thought that the laws of 
physics were set for the material universe by God, and suppose someone 
denied that: would that make such a person unfriendly to physics? I’d 
say not: it would only make her unfriendly to philosophical views held 
by most physicists. Similarly here: suppose most evolutionary scientists 
do in fact think this process is unguided, and that eP is in fact true. This 
opinion contains a philosophical or theological component with which 
I disagree. even if most of the biological experts endorse this theological 
component, that doesn’t convict me of being unfriendly to evolutionary 
science in disagreeing with them. It just makes me unfriendly to 
a philosophical or theological add-on those experts endorse. And their 
expertise, while admirable and extensive, does not extend to philosophy 
or theology.
Finally, question (III): ‘Do you now disagree with your earlier claims 
(e.g., in ‘When Faith and reason Clash’) suggesting that, in light of the 
evolutionary evidence, Darwinism is unlikely to be true?’
I  made those earlier claims quite a  long time ago, and I’ve been 
reading and thinking about this subject off and on from that time to this. 
rightly or wrongly, my thinking has not changed much during that time. 
In ‘When Faith and reason Clash’, I  said I  thought it was more likely 
than not that the common ancestry thesis was false. If I had to bet, I’d 
still bet on that horse, fortified, now, by the suggestive but not conclusive 
arguments against common ancestry offered by Stephen meyer in 
Darwin’s Doubt. I still see little reason to believe that universal ancestry 
is true (although since I am not a biologist, I take my failure to see such 
reason with a  grain of salt). Perhaps God did it by way of common 
ancestry; perhaps not. Perhaps human beings are related in this way to 
simian forebears; but also, again, perhaps not. Perhaps God specially 
created a  human pair (‘Adam and eve’ as we may call them) at some 
time in the past; then they would not have had simian or nonhuman 
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ancestors, and the common ancestry thesis would be false. on the other 
hand, perhaps at the time of the most recent bottleneck in the lineage 
leading to contemporary humanity, God picked out a particular human 
pair and bestowed on them a property whereby they could be said to 
be in the divine image; if that property were heritable, and dominant, 
this pair would be ancestral to all contemporary human beings. That 
scenario, unlike special creation, is compatible with universal common 
ancestry. I really can’t see any reason for thinking one of these scenarios 
much more likely than the other.
The main thing to see here, I  think, is that we aren’t obliged to 
have a firm opinion on this topic. The main lines and central tenets of 
Christian belief are clear; and the wise believer will invest considerably 
more credence in those central tenets than in propositions, like common 
ancestry or its denial, lying near the periphery.
